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|a A decision maker makes a ruling on a random case in each period. She is uncertain about the correct ruling until conducting a costly investigation. A ruling establishes a precedent, which cannot be violated under binding precedent. We compare the information acquisition incentives, the evolution of standards and the social welfare under nonbinding and binding precedents. Compared to non-binding precedent, under binding precedent, information acquisition incentives are stronger in earlier periods, but become weaker as more precedents are established. Although erroneous rulings may be perpetuated under binding precedent, welfare can be higher because of the more intensive investigation early on.
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A decision maker makes a ruling on a random case in each period. She is uncertain about the correct ruling until conducting a costly investigation. A ruling establishes a precedent, which cannot be violated under binding precedent. We compare the information acquisition incentives, the evolution of standards and the social welfare under nonbinding and binding precedents. Compared to non-binding precedent, under binding precedent, information acquisition incentives are stronger in earlier periods, but become weaker as more precedents are established. Although erroneous rulings may be perpetuated under binding precedent, welfare can be higher because of the more intensive investigation early on. |
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Osaka, Japan, The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, June 2020 |
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Osaka, Japan: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, June 2020 |
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Chen, Ying VerfasserIn (DE-588)133660729 (DE-627)550048219 (DE-576)302569170 aut, Learning while setting precedents Ying Chen, Hülya Eraslan, Osaka, Japan The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University June 2020, 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research no. 1092, A decision maker makes a ruling on a random case in each period. She is uncertain about the correct ruling until conducting a costly investigation. A ruling establishes a precedent, which cannot be violated under binding precedent. We compare the information acquisition incentives, the evolution of standards and the social welfare under nonbinding and binding precedents. Compared to non-binding precedent, under binding precedent, information acquisition incentives are stronger in earlier periods, but become weaker as more precedents are established. Although erroneous rulings may be perpetuated under binding precedent, welfare can be higher because of the more intensive investigation early on., Eraslan, Hülya VerfasserIn (DE-588)171894847 (DE-627)361531680 (DE-576)132650479 aut, Shakai-Keizai-Kenkyūsho Osaka Discussion paper no. 1092 1092 (DE-627)362341931 (DE-576)281223688 (DE-600)2106942-6, https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2020/DP1092.pdf Verlag kostenfrei, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230496 Resolving-System kostenfrei, https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2020/DP1092.pdf LFER, LFER 2020-08-07T17:42:56Z |
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Chen, Ying, Eraslan, Hülya, Learning while setting precedents, Shakai-Keizai-Kenkyūsho, Discussion paper, no. 1092, A decision maker makes a ruling on a random case in each period. She is uncertain about the correct ruling until conducting a costly investigation. A ruling establishes a precedent, which cannot be violated under binding precedent. We compare the information acquisition incentives, the evolution of standards and the social welfare under nonbinding and binding precedents. Compared to non-binding precedent, under binding precedent, information acquisition incentives are stronger in earlier periods, but become weaker as more precedents are established. Although erroneous rulings may be perpetuated under binding precedent, welfare can be higher because of the more intensive investigation early on. |
| title |
Learning while setting precedents |
| title_auth |
Learning while setting precedents |
| title_full |
Learning while setting precedents Ying Chen, Hülya Eraslan |
| title_fullStr |
Learning while setting precedents Ying Chen, Hülya Eraslan |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Learning while setting precedents Ying Chen, Hülya Eraslan |
| title_in_hierarchy |
no. 1092. Learning while setting precedents (June 2020) |
| title_short |
Learning while setting precedents |
| title_sort |
learning while setting precedents |
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https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2020/DP1092.pdf, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230496 |
