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| author_facet |
Fruchter, Gila E. Naseraldin, Hussein Fruchter, Gila E. Naseraldin, Hussein |
|---|---|
| author |
Fruchter, Gila E. Naseraldin, Hussein |
| spellingShingle |
Fruchter, Gila E. Naseraldin, Hussein Games Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach Applied Mathematics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty Statistics and Probability |
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fruchter, gila e. |
| spelling |
Fruchter, Gila E. Naseraldin, Hussein 2073-4336 MDPI AG Applied Mathematics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty Statistics and Probability http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12010015 <jats:p>Production emissions in the industrial sector are a major source of environmental pollution. In this paper, we explore how emission considerations are integrated with production decisions. We develop a dynamic model consisting of two firms located in the same industrial park, which satisfies exogenously given demands in separate markets. The two firms can build up or rundown stocks (full backlogging), both of which are costly. The emission cost depends on the total output of the two firms. We develop Nash equilibrium feedback strategies, where each firm decides on its output based on its inventory or the inventories of both. We also develop a social planning solution where decisions are centralized. We present the analytic results for the total profits in these settings. The results show the benefits of a decentralized approach over a centralized one, provided there is a mechanism for coordination. Finally, emission costs are compared for the various solution concepts.</jats:p> Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach Games |
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10.3390/g12010015 |
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MDPI AG, 2021 |
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MDPI AG, 2021 |
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2073-4336 |
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| title |
Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach |
| title_unstemmed |
Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach |
| title_full |
Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach |
| title_fullStr |
Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach |
| title_short |
Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach |
| title_sort |
coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities: a differential game approach |
| topic |
Applied Mathematics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty Statistics and Probability |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12010015 |
| publishDate |
2021 |
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15 |
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<jats:p>Production emissions in the industrial sector are a major source of environmental pollution. In this paper, we explore how emission considerations are integrated with production decisions. We develop a dynamic model consisting of two firms located in the same industrial park, which satisfies exogenously given demands in separate markets. The two firms can build up or rundown stocks (full backlogging), both of which are costly. The emission cost depends on the total output of the two firms. We develop Nash equilibrium feedback strategies, where each firm decides on its output based on its inventory or the inventories of both. We also develop a social planning solution where decisions are centralized. We present the analytic results for the total profits in these settings. The results show the benefits of a decentralized approach over a centralized one, provided there is a mechanism for coordination. Finally, emission costs are compared for the various solution concepts.</jats:p> |
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| author | Fruchter, Gila E., Naseraldin, Hussein |
| author_facet | Fruchter, Gila E., Naseraldin, Hussein, Fruchter, Gila E., Naseraldin, Hussein |
| author_sort | fruchter, gila e. |
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| description | <jats:p>Production emissions in the industrial sector are a major source of environmental pollution. In this paper, we explore how emission considerations are integrated with production decisions. We develop a dynamic model consisting of two firms located in the same industrial park, which satisfies exogenously given demands in separate markets. The two firms can build up or rundown stocks (full backlogging), both of which are costly. The emission cost depends on the total output of the two firms. We develop Nash equilibrium feedback strategies, where each firm decides on its output based on its inventory or the inventories of both. We also develop a social planning solution where decisions are centralized. We present the analytic results for the total profits in these settings. The results show the benefits of a decentralized approach over a centralized one, provided there is a mechanism for coordination. Finally, emission costs are compared for the various solution concepts.</jats:p> |
| doi_str_mv | 10.3390/g12010015 |
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| spelling | Fruchter, Gila E. Naseraldin, Hussein 2073-4336 MDPI AG Applied Mathematics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty Statistics and Probability http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12010015 <jats:p>Production emissions in the industrial sector are a major source of environmental pollution. In this paper, we explore how emission considerations are integrated with production decisions. We develop a dynamic model consisting of two firms located in the same industrial park, which satisfies exogenously given demands in separate markets. The two firms can build up or rundown stocks (full backlogging), both of which are costly. The emission cost depends on the total output of the two firms. We develop Nash equilibrium feedback strategies, where each firm decides on its output based on its inventory or the inventories of both. We also develop a social planning solution where decisions are centralized. We present the analytic results for the total profits in these settings. The results show the benefits of a decentralized approach over a centralized one, provided there is a mechanism for coordination. Finally, emission costs are compared for the various solution concepts.</jats:p> Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach Games |
| spellingShingle | Fruchter, Gila E., Naseraldin, Hussein, Games, Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach, Applied Mathematics, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Statistics and Probability |
| title | Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach |
| title_full | Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach |
| title_fullStr | Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach |
| title_full_unstemmed | Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach |
| title_short | Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach |
| title_sort | coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities: a differential game approach |
| title_unstemmed | Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach |
| topic | Applied Mathematics, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Statistics and Probability |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12010015 |