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| author_facet |
Abe, Takaaki Abe, Takaaki |
|---|---|
| author |
Abe, Takaaki |
| spellingShingle |
Abe, Takaaki Games Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach Applied Mathematics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty Statistics and Probability |
| author_sort |
abe, takaaki |
| spelling |
Abe, Takaaki 2073-4336 MDPI AG Applied Mathematics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty Statistics and Probability http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12010014 <jats:p>In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is “moderate”, then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a partition function form game. We also show that if the technology for the low-cost production can be copied, then the cost advantage may prevent a cartel from splitting.</jats:p> Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach Games |
| doi_str_mv |
10.3390/g12010014 |
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Online Free |
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Mathematik |
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DE-D275 DE-Bn3 DE-Brt1 DE-Zwi2 DE-D161 DE-Gla1 DE-Zi4 DE-15 DE-Rs1 DE-Pl11 DE-105 DE-14 DE-Ch1 DE-L229 |
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MDPI AG, 2021 |
| imprint_str_mv |
MDPI AG, 2021 |
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2073-4336 |
| issn_str_mv |
2073-4336 |
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English |
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MDPI AG (CrossRef) |
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abe2021cartelformationincournotcompetitionwithasymmetriccostsapartitionfunctionapproach |
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2021 |
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MDPI AG |
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Games |
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49 |
| title |
Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach |
| title_unstemmed |
Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach |
| title_full |
Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach |
| title_fullStr |
Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach |
| title_short |
Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach |
| title_sort |
cartel formation in cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach |
| topic |
Applied Mathematics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty Statistics and Probability |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12010014 |
| publishDate |
2021 |
| physical |
14 |
| description |
<jats:p>In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is “moderate”, then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a partition function form game. We also show that if the technology for the low-cost production can be copied, then the cost advantage may prevent a cartel from splitting.</jats:p> |
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| author | Abe, Takaaki |
| author_facet | Abe, Takaaki, Abe, Takaaki |
| author_sort | abe, takaaki |
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| container_title | Games |
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| description | <jats:p>In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is “moderate”, then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a partition function form game. We also show that if the technology for the low-cost production can be copied, then the cost advantage may prevent a cartel from splitting.</jats:p> |
| doi_str_mv | 10.3390/g12010014 |
| facet_avail | Online, Free |
| finc_class_facet | Mathematik |
| format | ElectronicArticle |
| format_de105 | Article, E-Article |
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| id | ai-49-aHR0cDovL2R4LmRvaS5vcmcvMTAuMzM5MC9nMTIwMTAwMTQ |
| imprint | MDPI AG, 2021 |
| imprint_str_mv | MDPI AG, 2021 |
| institution | DE-D275, DE-Bn3, DE-Brt1, DE-Zwi2, DE-D161, DE-Gla1, DE-Zi4, DE-15, DE-Rs1, DE-Pl11, DE-105, DE-14, DE-Ch1, DE-L229 |
| issn | 2073-4336 |
| issn_str_mv | 2073-4336 |
| language | English |
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| physical | 14 |
| publishDate | 2021 |
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| publisher | MDPI AG |
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| series | Games |
| source_id | 49 |
| spelling | Abe, Takaaki 2073-4336 MDPI AG Applied Mathematics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty Statistics and Probability http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12010014 <jats:p>In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is “moderate”, then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a partition function form game. We also show that if the technology for the low-cost production can be copied, then the cost advantage may prevent a cartel from splitting.</jats:p> Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach Games |
| spellingShingle | Abe, Takaaki, Games, Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach, Applied Mathematics, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Statistics and Probability |
| title | Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach |
| title_full | Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach |
| title_fullStr | Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach |
| title_short | Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach |
| title_sort | cartel formation in cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach |
| title_unstemmed | Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach |
| topic | Applied Mathematics, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Statistics and Probability |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12010014 |