Eintrag weiter verarbeiten

Group level effects of social versus individual learning

Gespeichert in:

Personen und Körperschaften: Jost, Jürgen (VerfasserIn), Li, Wei (VerfasserIn)
Titel: Group level effects of social versus individual learning/ Jürgen Jost and Wei Li
Format: E-Book
Sprache: Englisch
veröffentlicht:
Leipzig Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften 2013
Gesamtaufnahme: Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften: Preprints ; 2013,12
Schlagwörter:
Quelle: Verbunddaten SWB
Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen
LEADER 02999cam a2200469 4500
001 0-77105680X
003 DE-627
005 20220716121630.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 131111s2013 gw |||||ot 00| ||eng c
035 |a (DE-627)77105680X 
035 |a (DE-576)9771056808 
035 |a (DE-599)GBV77105680X 
035 |a (OCoLC)931443844 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rakwb 
041 |a eng 
044 |c XA-DE 
084 |a 17,1  |2 ssgn 
084 |a 31.00  |2 bkl 
100 1 |a Jost, Jürgen  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Group level effects of social versus individual learning  |c Jürgen Jost and Wei Li 
264 1 |a Leipzig  |b Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften  |c 2013 
300 |a Online-Ressource (11 S., 6375 kB) 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a Preprints / Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften  |v 2013,12 
520 |a We study the effects of learning by imitating others within the framework of an iterated game in which the members of two complementary populations interact via random pairing at each round. This allows us to compare both the fitness of different strategies within a population and the performance of populations in which members have access to different types of strategies. Previous studies reveal some emergent dynamics at the population level when players learn individually. We here investigate a different mechanism in which players can choose between two different learning strategies, individual or social. Imitating behavior can spread within a mixed population, with the frequency of imitators varying over generation time. When compared to a pure population with solely individual learners, a mixed population with both individual- and social learners can do better, independently of the precise learning scheme employed. We can then search for the best imitating strategy. Imitating the neighbor with the highest payoff turns out to be consistently superior. This is in agreement with findings in experimental and model studies that have been carried out in different settings. 
655 7 |a Forschungsbericht  |0 (DE-588)4155043-2  |0 (DE-627)10467444X  |0 (DE-576)209815833  |2 gnd-content 
700 1 |a Li, Wei  |4 aut 
810 2 |a Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften  |g Leipzig  |t Preprints  |v 2013,12  |9 2013012  |w (DE-627)612840301  |w (DE-576)313444951  |w (DE-600)2525233-1 
856 4 0 |u http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/e/MPI_Math_Nat/preprint2013_12.pdf  |q application/pdf  |x Verlag  |z kostenfrei  |3 Volltext 
936 b k |a 31.00  |j Mathematik: Allgemeines  |0 (DE-627)106415808 
951 |a BO 
856 4 0 |u http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/e/MPI_Math_Nat/preprint2013_12.pdf  |9 LFER 
852 |a LFER  |z 2019-05-07T00:00:00Z 
970 |c OD 
971 |c EBOOK 
972 |c EBOOK 
973 |c EB 
935 |a lfer 
980 |a 77105680X  |b 0  |k 77105680X  |o 9771056808  |c lfer 
openURL url_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fvufind.svn.sourceforge.net%3Agenerator&rft.title=Group+level+effects+of+social+versus+individual+learning&rft.date=2013&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.creator=Jost%2C+J%C3%BCrgen&rft.pub=Max-Planck-Institut+f%C3%BCr+Mathematik+in+den+Naturwissenschaften&rft.format=eBook&rft.language=English
SOLR
_version_ 1757989890270691328
access_facet Electronic Resources
author Jost, Jürgen, Li, Wei
author_facet Jost, Jürgen, Li, Wei
author_role aut, aut
author_sort Jost, Jürgen
author_variant j j jj, w l wl
callnumber-sort
collection lfer
contents We study the effects of learning by imitating others within the framework of an iterated game in which the members of two complementary populations interact via random pairing at each round. This allows us to compare both the fitness of different strategies within a population and the performance of populations in which members have access to different types of strategies. Previous studies reveal some emergent dynamics at the population level when players learn individually. We here investigate a different mechanism in which players can choose between two different learning strategies, individual or social. Imitating behavior can spread within a mixed population, with the frequency of imitators varying over generation time. When compared to a pure population with solely individual learners, a mixed population with both individual- and social learners can do better, independently of the precise learning scheme employed. We can then search for the best imitating strategy. Imitating the neighbor with the highest payoff turns out to be consistently superior. This is in agreement with findings in experimental and model studies that have been carried out in different settings.
ctrlnum (DE-627)77105680X, (DE-576)9771056808, (DE-599)GBV77105680X, (OCoLC)931443844
facet_avail Online, Free
finc_class_facet not assigned
fincclass_txtF_mv science-mathematics
format eBook
format_access_txtF_mv Book, E-Book
format_de105 Ebook
format_de14 Book, E-Book
format_de15 Book, E-Book
format_del152 Buch
format_detail_txtF_mv text-online-monograph-independent
format_dezi4 e-Book
format_finc Book, E-Book
format_legacy ElectronicBook
format_legacy_nrw Book, E-Book
format_nrw Book, E-Book
format_strict_txtF_mv E-Book
genre Forschungsbericht (DE-588)4155043-2 (DE-627)10467444X (DE-576)209815833 gnd-content
genre_facet Forschungsbericht
geogr_code not assigned
geogr_code_person not assigned
hierarchy_parent_id 0-612840301
hierarchy_parent_title Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften: Preprints
hierarchy_sequence 2013012
hierarchy_top_id 0-612840301
hierarchy_top_title Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften: Preprints
id 0-77105680X
illustrated Not Illustrated
imprint Leipzig, Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften, 2013
imprint_str_mv Leipzig: Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften, 2013
institution DE-D117, DE-105, LFER, DE-Ch1, DE-15, DE-14, DE-Zwi2
is_hierarchy_id 0-77105680X
is_hierarchy_title Group level effects of social versus individual learning
isil_str_mv LFER
kxp_id_str 77105680X
language English
last_indexed 2023-02-16T12:16:46.705Z
match_str jost2013groupleveleffectsofsocialversusindividuallearning
mega_collection Verbunddaten SWB, Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen
misc_de105 EBOOK
multipart_link 313444951
multipart_part (313444951)Leipzig
oclc_num 931443844
physical Online-Ressource (11 S., 6375 kB)
publishDate 2013
publishDateSort 2013
publishPlace Leipzig
publisher Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften
record_format marcfinc
record_id 9771056808
recordtype marcfinc
rvk_facet No subject assigned
series Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften, Preprints, 2013,12
series2 Preprints / Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften ; 2013,12
source_id 0
spelling Jost, Jürgen aut, Group level effects of social versus individual learning Jürgen Jost and Wei Li, Leipzig Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften 2013, Online-Ressource (11 S., 6375 kB), Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, Preprints / Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften 2013,12, We study the effects of learning by imitating others within the framework of an iterated game in which the members of two complementary populations interact via random pairing at each round. This allows us to compare both the fitness of different strategies within a population and the performance of populations in which members have access to different types of strategies. Previous studies reveal some emergent dynamics at the population level when players learn individually. We here investigate a different mechanism in which players can choose between two different learning strategies, individual or social. Imitating behavior can spread within a mixed population, with the frequency of imitators varying over generation time. When compared to a pure population with solely individual learners, a mixed population with both individual- and social learners can do better, independently of the precise learning scheme employed. We can then search for the best imitating strategy. Imitating the neighbor with the highest payoff turns out to be consistently superior. This is in agreement with findings in experimental and model studies that have been carried out in different settings., Forschungsbericht (DE-588)4155043-2 (DE-627)10467444X (DE-576)209815833 gnd-content, Li, Wei aut, Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften Leipzig Preprints 2013,12 2013012 (DE-627)612840301 (DE-576)313444951 (DE-600)2525233-1, http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/e/MPI_Math_Nat/preprint2013_12.pdf application/pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext, http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/e/MPI_Math_Nat/preprint2013_12.pdf LFER, LFER 2019-05-07T00:00:00Z
spellingShingle Jost, Jürgen, Li, Wei, Group level effects of social versus individual learning, Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften, Preprints, 2013,12, We study the effects of learning by imitating others within the framework of an iterated game in which the members of two complementary populations interact via random pairing at each round. This allows us to compare both the fitness of different strategies within a population and the performance of populations in which members have access to different types of strategies. Previous studies reveal some emergent dynamics at the population level when players learn individually. We here investigate a different mechanism in which players can choose between two different learning strategies, individual or social. Imitating behavior can spread within a mixed population, with the frequency of imitators varying over generation time. When compared to a pure population with solely individual learners, a mixed population with both individual- and social learners can do better, independently of the precise learning scheme employed. We can then search for the best imitating strategy. Imitating the neighbor with the highest payoff turns out to be consistently superior. This is in agreement with findings in experimental and model studies that have been carried out in different settings., Forschungsbericht
swb_id_str 9771056808
title Group level effects of social versus individual learning
title_auth Group level effects of social versus individual learning
title_full Group level effects of social versus individual learning Jürgen Jost and Wei Li
title_fullStr Group level effects of social versus individual learning Jürgen Jost and Wei Li
title_full_unstemmed Group level effects of social versus individual learning Jürgen Jost and Wei Li
title_in_hierarchy 2013,12. Group level effects of social versus individual learning (2013)
title_short Group level effects of social versus individual learning
title_sort group level effects of social versus individual learning
topic Forschungsbericht
topic_facet Forschungsbericht
url http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/e/MPI_Math_Nat/preprint2013_12.pdf