|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
03364cam a2200505 4500 |
| 001 |
0-756358434 |
| 003 |
DE-627 |
| 005 |
20220715152531.0 |
| 007 |
cr uuu---uuuuu |
| 008 |
130801s2010 gw |||||ot 00| ||eng c |
| 035 |
|
|
|a (DE-627)756358434
|
| 035 |
|
|
|a (DE-576)9756358432
|
| 035 |
|
|
|a (DE-599)GBV756358434
|
| 035 |
|
|
|a (OCoLC)931320916
|
| 040 |
|
|
|a DE-627
|b ger
|c DE-627
|e rakwb
|
| 041 |
|
|
|a eng
|
| 044 |
|
|
|c XA-DE
|
| 084 |
|
|
|a 17,1
|2 ssgn
|
| 084 |
|
|
|a 31.00
|2 bkl
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a Jost, Jürgen
|d 1956-
|0 (DE-588)115774564
|0 (DE-627)077462211
|0 (DE-576)161613853
|4 aut
|
| 245 |
1 |
0 |
|a Learning, Evolution and Population Dynamics
|c Jürgen Jost; Wei Li
|
| 264 |
|
1 |
|a Leipzig
|b Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften
|c 2010
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a Online-Ressource (28 S., 2396 kB)
|
| 336 |
|
|
|a Text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
|
| 337 |
|
|
|a Computermedien
|b c
|2 rdamedia
|
| 338 |
|
|
|a Online-Ressource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
|
| 490 |
1 |
|
|a Preprints / Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften
|v 2010,68
|
| 520 |
|
|
|a We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs players from opposite populations. It is symmetric at the individual level, but has many equilibria that are more or less favorable to the members of the two populations. Which of these equilibria is then attained is decided by the dynamics at the population level. Players play repeatedly, but in each round with a new opponent. They can learn from their previous encounters and translate this into their actions in the present round on the basis of strategic schemes. The schemes can be quite simple, or very elaborate. We can then break the symmetry in the game and give the members of the two populations access to different strategy spaces. Typically, simpler strategy types have an advantage because they tend to go more quickly toward a favorable equilibrium which, once reached, the other population is forced to accept. Also, populations with bolder individuals that may not fare so well at the level of individual performance may obtain an advantage toward ones with more timid players. By checking the effects of parameters such as the generation length or the mutation rate, we are able to compare the relative contributions of individual learning and evolutionary adaptations.
|
| 655 |
|
7 |
|a Forschungsbericht
|0 (DE-588)4155043-2
|0 (DE-627)10467444X
|0 (DE-576)209815833
|2 gnd-content
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Li, Wei
|4 aut
|
| 810 |
2 |
|
|a Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften
|g Leipzig
|t Preprints
|v 2010,68
|9 2010068
|w (DE-627)612840301
|w (DE-576)313444951
|w (DE-600)2525233-1
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/e/MPI_Math_Nat/preprint2010_68.pdf
|q application/pdf
|x Verlag
|z kostenfrei
|3 Volltext
|
| 936 |
b |
k |
|a 31.00
|j Mathematik: Allgemeines
|0 (DE-627)106415808
|
| 951 |
|
|
|a BO
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/e/MPI_Math_Nat/preprint2010_68.pdf
|9 LFER
|
| 852 |
|
|
|a LFER
|z 2019-05-07T00:00:00Z
|
| 970 |
|
|
|c OD
|
| 971 |
|
|
|c EBOOK
|
| 972 |
|
|
|c EBOOK
|
| 973 |
|
|
|c EB
|
| 935 |
|
|
|a lfer
|
| 900 |
|
|
|a Jost, J.
|
| 900 |
|
|
|a Yosuto, Yurugen
|
| 951 |
|
|
|b XA-DE
|
| 980 |
|
|
|a 756358434
|b 0
|k 756358434
|o 9756358432
|c lfer
|
SOLR
| _version_ |
1757989713930616832 |
| access_facet |
Electronic Resources |
| author |
Jost, Jürgen, Li, Wei |
| author_facet |
Jost, Jürgen, Li, Wei |
| author_role |
aut, aut |
| author_sort |
Jost, Jürgen 1956- |
| author_variant |
j j jj, w l wl |
| callnumber-sort |
|
| collection |
lfer |
| contents |
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs players from opposite populations. It is symmetric at the individual level, but has many equilibria that are more or less favorable to the members of the two populations. Which of these equilibria is then attained is decided by the dynamics at the population level. Players play repeatedly, but in each round with a new opponent. They can learn from their previous encounters and translate this into their actions in the present round on the basis of strategic schemes. The schemes can be quite simple, or very elaborate. We can then break the symmetry in the game and give the members of the two populations access to different strategy spaces. Typically, simpler strategy types have an advantage because they tend to go more quickly toward a favorable equilibrium which, once reached, the other population is forced to accept. Also, populations with bolder individuals that may not fare so well at the level of individual performance may obtain an advantage toward ones with more timid players. By checking the effects of parameters such as the generation length or the mutation rate, we are able to compare the relative contributions of individual learning and evolutionary adaptations. |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)756358434, (DE-576)9756358432, (DE-599)GBV756358434, (OCoLC)931320916 |
| facet_avail |
Online, Free |
| finc_class_facet |
not assigned |
| fincclass_txtF_mv |
science-mathematics |
| format |
eBook |
| format_access_txtF_mv |
Book, E-Book |
| format_de105 |
Ebook |
| format_de14 |
Book, E-Book |
| format_de15 |
Book, E-Book |
| format_del152 |
Buch |
| format_detail_txtF_mv |
text-online-monograph-independent |
| format_dezi4 |
e-Book |
| format_finc |
Book, E-Book |
| format_legacy |
ElectronicBook |
| format_legacy_nrw |
Book, E-Book |
| format_nrw |
Book, E-Book |
| format_strict_txtF_mv |
E-Book |
| genre |
Forschungsbericht (DE-588)4155043-2 (DE-627)10467444X (DE-576)209815833 gnd-content |
| genre_facet |
Forschungsbericht |
| geogr_code |
not assigned |
| geogr_code_person |
Germany |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
0-612840301 |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften: Preprints |
| hierarchy_sequence |
2010068 |
| hierarchy_top_id |
0-612840301 |
| hierarchy_top_title |
Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften: Preprints |
| id |
0-756358434 |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| imprint |
Leipzig, Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften, 2010 |
| imprint_str_mv |
Leipzig: Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften, 2010 |
| institution |
DE-D117, DE-105, LFER, DE-Ch1, DE-15, DE-14, DE-Zwi2 |
| is_hierarchy_id |
0-756358434 |
| is_hierarchy_title |
Learning, Evolution and Population Dynamics |
| isil_str_mv |
LFER |
| kxp_id_str |
756358434 |
| language |
English |
| last_indexed |
2023-02-16T12:13:56.32Z |
| match_str |
jost2010learningevolutionandpopulationdynamics |
| mega_collection |
Verbunddaten SWB, Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen |
| misc_de105 |
EBOOK |
| multipart_link |
313444951 |
| multipart_part |
(313444951)Leipzig |
| names_id_str_mv |
(DE-588)115774564, (DE-627)077462211, (DE-576)161613853 |
| oclc_num |
931320916 |
| physical |
Online-Ressource (28 S., 2396 kB) |
| publishDate |
2010 |
| publishDateSort |
2010 |
| publishPlace |
Leipzig |
| publisher |
Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften |
| record_format |
marcfinc |
| record_id |
9756358432 |
| recordtype |
marcfinc |
| rvk_facet |
No subject assigned |
| series |
Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften, Preprints, 2010,68 |
| series2 |
Preprints / Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften ; 2010,68 |
| source_id |
0 |
| spelling |
Jost, Jürgen 1956- (DE-588)115774564 (DE-627)077462211 (DE-576)161613853 aut, Learning, Evolution and Population Dynamics Jürgen Jost; Wei Li, Leipzig Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften 2010, Online-Ressource (28 S., 2396 kB), Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, Preprints / Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften 2010,68, We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs players from opposite populations. It is symmetric at the individual level, but has many equilibria that are more or less favorable to the members of the two populations. Which of these equilibria is then attained is decided by the dynamics at the population level. Players play repeatedly, but in each round with a new opponent. They can learn from their previous encounters and translate this into their actions in the present round on the basis of strategic schemes. The schemes can be quite simple, or very elaborate. We can then break the symmetry in the game and give the members of the two populations access to different strategy spaces. Typically, simpler strategy types have an advantage because they tend to go more quickly toward a favorable equilibrium which, once reached, the other population is forced to accept. Also, populations with bolder individuals that may not fare so well at the level of individual performance may obtain an advantage toward ones with more timid players. By checking the effects of parameters such as the generation length or the mutation rate, we are able to compare the relative contributions of individual learning and evolutionary adaptations., Forschungsbericht (DE-588)4155043-2 (DE-627)10467444X (DE-576)209815833 gnd-content, Li, Wei aut, Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften Leipzig Preprints 2010,68 2010068 (DE-627)612840301 (DE-576)313444951 (DE-600)2525233-1, http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/e/MPI_Math_Nat/preprint2010_68.pdf application/pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext, http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/e/MPI_Math_Nat/preprint2010_68.pdf LFER, LFER 2019-05-07T00:00:00Z |
| spellingShingle |
Jost, Jürgen, Li, Wei, Learning, Evolution and Population Dynamics, Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften, Preprints, 2010,68, We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs players from opposite populations. It is symmetric at the individual level, but has many equilibria that are more or less favorable to the members of the two populations. Which of these equilibria is then attained is decided by the dynamics at the population level. Players play repeatedly, but in each round with a new opponent. They can learn from their previous encounters and translate this into their actions in the present round on the basis of strategic schemes. The schemes can be quite simple, or very elaborate. We can then break the symmetry in the game and give the members of the two populations access to different strategy spaces. Typically, simpler strategy types have an advantage because they tend to go more quickly toward a favorable equilibrium which, once reached, the other population is forced to accept. Also, populations with bolder individuals that may not fare so well at the level of individual performance may obtain an advantage toward ones with more timid players. By checking the effects of parameters such as the generation length or the mutation rate, we are able to compare the relative contributions of individual learning and evolutionary adaptations., Forschungsbericht |
| swb_id_str |
9756358432 |
| title |
Learning, Evolution and Population Dynamics |
| title_auth |
Learning, Evolution and Population Dynamics |
| title_full |
Learning, Evolution and Population Dynamics Jürgen Jost; Wei Li |
| title_fullStr |
Learning, Evolution and Population Dynamics Jürgen Jost; Wei Li |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Learning, Evolution and Population Dynamics Jürgen Jost; Wei Li |
| title_in_hierarchy |
2010,68. Learning, Evolution and Population Dynamics (2010) |
| title_short |
Learning, Evolution and Population Dynamics |
| title_sort |
learning evolution and population dynamics |
| topic |
Forschungsbericht |
| topic_facet |
Forschungsbericht |
| url |
http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/e/MPI_Math_Nat/preprint2010_68.pdf |
