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Invitation games: an experimental approach to coalition formation
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Games 12(2021), 3 vom: Sept., Artikel-ID 64, Seite 1-20 |
|---|---|
| Personen und Körperschaften: | , , |
| Titel: | Invitation games: an experimental approach to coalition formation/ Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki and Taro Shinoda |
| Format: | E-Book-Kapitel |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| veröffentlicht: |
2021
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| Gesamtaufnahme: |
: Games, 12(2021), 3 vom: Sept., Artikel-ID 64, Seite 1-20
, volume:12 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Quelle: | Verbunddaten SWB Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen |
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| 520 | |a This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition$da group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we invite the subjects to join a meeting simultaneously, so they cannot know the other subjects' decisions. In the other setting, we ask them sequentially, which allows each subject to know his or her predecessor's choice. Those who decide to join the meeting form a coalition and earn payoffs according to their actions and individual preferences. As a result, we obtain the following findings. First, the sequential mechanism induces higher social surplus than the simultaneous mechanism. Second, most subjects make choices consistent with the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the sequential setting and choose the dominant strategy in the simultaneous setting, when a dominant strategy exists. Finally, when the subjects need to look further ahead to make a theoretically rational choice, they are more likely to fail to choose rationally. | ||
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| contents | This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition$da group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we invite the subjects to join a meeting simultaneously, so they cannot know the other subjects' decisions. In the other setting, we ask them sequentially, which allows each subject to know his or her predecessor's choice. Those who decide to join the meeting form a coalition and earn payoffs according to their actions and individual preferences. As a result, we obtain the following findings. First, the sequential mechanism induces higher social surplus than the simultaneous mechanism. Second, most subjects make choices consistent with the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the sequential setting and choose the dominant strategy in the simultaneous setting, when a dominant strategy exists. Finally, when the subjects need to look further ahead to make a theoretically rational choice, they are more likely to fail to choose rationally. |
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| spelling | Abe, Takaaki VerfasserIn (DE-588)1192341562 (DE-627)1670678067 aut, Invitation games an experimental approach to coalition formation Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki and Taro Shinoda, 2021, Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2, This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition$da group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we invite the subjects to join a meeting simultaneously, so they cannot know the other subjects' decisions. In the other setting, we ask them sequentially, which allows each subject to know his or her predecessor's choice. Those who decide to join the meeting form a coalition and earn payoffs according to their actions and individual preferences. As a result, we obtain the following findings. First, the sequential mechanism induces higher social surplus than the simultaneous mechanism. Second, most subjects make choices consistent with the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the sequential setting and choose the dominant strategy in the simultaneous setting, when a dominant strategy exists. Finally, when the subjects need to look further ahead to make a theoretically rational choice, they are more likely to fail to choose rationally., DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, coalition formation, laboratory experiment, non-cooperative games, Aufsatz in Zeitschrift DE-206, Funaki, Yukihiko VerfasserIn (DE-588)17015713X (DE-627)060202106 (DE-576)131063960 aut, Shinoda, Taro VerfasserIn (DE-588)1240167326 (DE-627)1768056927 aut, Enthalten in Games Basel : MDPI, 2010 12(2021), 3 vom: Sept., Artikel-ID 64, Seite 1-20 Online-Ressource (DE-627)614096553 (DE-600)2527220-2 (DE-576)31395867X 2073-4336 nnns, volume:12 year:2021 number:3 month:09 elocationid:64 pages:1-20, https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/3/64/pdf Verlag kostenfrei, https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030064 Resolving-System kostenfrei, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/257546 Resolving-System kostenfrei, https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030064 LFER, https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/3/64/pdf LFER, LFER 2021-10-06T03:54:36Z |
| spellingShingle | Abe, Takaaki, Funaki, Yukihiko, Shinoda, Taro, Invitation games: an experimental approach to coalition formation, This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition$da group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we invite the subjects to join a meeting simultaneously, so they cannot know the other subjects' decisions. In the other setting, we ask them sequentially, which allows each subject to know his or her predecessor's choice. Those who decide to join the meeting form a coalition and earn payoffs according to their actions and individual preferences. As a result, we obtain the following findings. First, the sequential mechanism induces higher social surplus than the simultaneous mechanism. Second, most subjects make choices consistent with the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the sequential setting and choose the dominant strategy in the simultaneous setting, when a dominant strategy exists. Finally, when the subjects need to look further ahead to make a theoretically rational choice, they are more likely to fail to choose rationally., coalition formation, laboratory experiment, non-cooperative games, Aufsatz in Zeitschrift |
| title | Invitation games: an experimental approach to coalition formation |
| title_auth | Invitation games an experimental approach to coalition formation |
| title_full | Invitation games an experimental approach to coalition formation Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki and Taro Shinoda |
| title_fullStr | Invitation games an experimental approach to coalition formation Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki and Taro Shinoda |
| title_full_unstemmed | Invitation games an experimental approach to coalition formation Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki and Taro Shinoda |
| title_in_hierarchy | Invitation games: an experimental approach to coalition formation / Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki and Taro Shinoda, |
| title_short | Invitation games |
| title_sort | invitation games an experimental approach to coalition formation |
| title_sub | an experimental approach to coalition formation |
| topic | coalition formation, laboratory experiment, non-cooperative games, Aufsatz in Zeitschrift |
| topic_facet | coalition formation, laboratory experiment, non-cooperative games, Aufsatz in Zeitschrift |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/3/64/pdf, https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030064, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/257546 |