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Dividend payouts: majority control and rent extraction
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of business economics and management 19(2018), 4, Seite 648-672 |
|---|---|
| Personen und Körperschaften: | , |
| Titel: | Dividend payouts: majority control and rent extraction/ Seniha Besim, Cahit Adaoglu |
| Format: | E-Book-Kapitel |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| veröffentlicht: |
2018
|
| Gesamtaufnahme: |
: Journal of business economics and management, 19(2018), 4, Seite 648-672
, volume:19 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Quelle: | Verbunddaten SWB Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen |
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| 520 | |a In Eurasia, Turkey has a "crony" capitalist system with majority control and business groups (BGs) in the hands of a few families. These business groups are often organised around a holding company. We analyse the dividend payouts of family controlled Borsa Istanbul companies, which are affiliated to holding and non-holding BGs. We investigate and quantify the effects of several control-enhancing mechanisms (CEMs) on dividend payouts. We use precise quantitative proxies for CEMs to measure the divergence between control and ownership rights. Supporting the rent extraction hypothesis, holding business group companies have lower dividend payouts as the divergence between control and ownership rights widens and the pyramid wedge increases. However, controlling foreign-family coalitions in holding business group companies curb the rent extraction problem by having a positive effect on the dividend payouts. Overall, for family controlled holding BG companies, the effects of company-specific financial control variables on dividend payouts are stronger than the effects of CEMs. For family controlled non-holding BG companies, there is no empirical support for either the rent extraction or the reputation building hypotheses. The company-specific financial control variables are the main determinants of dividend payouts for family controlled non-holding BG companies. | ||
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| contents | In Eurasia, Turkey has a "crony" capitalist system with majority control and business groups (BGs) in the hands of a few families. These business groups are often organised around a holding company. We analyse the dividend payouts of family controlled Borsa Istanbul companies, which are affiliated to holding and non-holding BGs. We investigate and quantify the effects of several control-enhancing mechanisms (CEMs) on dividend payouts. We use precise quantitative proxies for CEMs to measure the divergence between control and ownership rights. Supporting the rent extraction hypothesis, holding business group companies have lower dividend payouts as the divergence between control and ownership rights widens and the pyramid wedge increases. However, controlling foreign-family coalitions in holding business group companies curb the rent extraction problem by having a positive effect on the dividend payouts. Overall, for family controlled holding BG companies, the effects of company-specific financial control variables on dividend payouts are stronger than the effects of CEMs. For family controlled non-holding BG companies, there is no empirical support for either the rent extraction or the reputation building hypotheses. The company-specific financial control variables are the main determinants of dividend payouts for family controlled non-holding BG companies. |
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| spelling | Besim, Seniha VerfasserIn aut, Dividend payouts: majority control and rent extraction Seniha Besim, Cahit Adaoglu, 2018, Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2, In Eurasia, Turkey has a "crony" capitalist system with majority control and business groups (BGs) in the hands of a few families. These business groups are often organised around a holding company. We analyse the dividend payouts of family controlled Borsa Istanbul companies, which are affiliated to holding and non-holding BGs. We investigate and quantify the effects of several control-enhancing mechanisms (CEMs) on dividend payouts. We use precise quantitative proxies for CEMs to measure the divergence between control and ownership rights. Supporting the rent extraction hypothesis, holding business group companies have lower dividend payouts as the divergence between control and ownership rights widens and the pyramid wedge increases. However, controlling foreign-family coalitions in holding business group companies curb the rent extraction problem by having a positive effect on the dividend payouts. Overall, for family controlled holding BG companies, the effects of company-specific financial control variables on dividend payouts are stronger than the effects of CEMs. For family controlled non-holding BG companies, there is no empirical support for either the rent extraction or the reputation building hypotheses. The company-specific financial control variables are the main determinants of dividend payouts for family controlled non-holding BG companies., DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, Aufsatz in Zeitschrift DE-206, Adaoglu, Cahit VerfasserIn aut, Enthalten in Journal of business economics and management Vilnius : VTGU Publ. House "Technika", 2003 19(2018), 4, Seite 648-672 Online-Ressource (DE-627)55226010X (DE-600)2400520-4 (DE-576)27798033X 2029-4433 nnns, volume:19 year:2018 number:4 pages:648-672, https://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/JBEM/article/view/6808/5975 Verlag kostenfrei, https://doi.org/10.3846/jbem.2018.6808 Resolving-System kostenfrei, https://doi.org/10.3846/jbem.2018.6808 LFER, https://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/JBEM/article/view/6808/5975 LFER, LFER 2020-04-07T00:00:00Z |
| spellingShingle | Besim, Seniha, Adaoglu, Cahit, Dividend payouts: majority control and rent extraction, In Eurasia, Turkey has a "crony" capitalist system with majority control and business groups (BGs) in the hands of a few families. These business groups are often organised around a holding company. We analyse the dividend payouts of family controlled Borsa Istanbul companies, which are affiliated to holding and non-holding BGs. We investigate and quantify the effects of several control-enhancing mechanisms (CEMs) on dividend payouts. We use precise quantitative proxies for CEMs to measure the divergence between control and ownership rights. Supporting the rent extraction hypothesis, holding business group companies have lower dividend payouts as the divergence between control and ownership rights widens and the pyramid wedge increases. However, controlling foreign-family coalitions in holding business group companies curb the rent extraction problem by having a positive effect on the dividend payouts. Overall, for family controlled holding BG companies, the effects of company-specific financial control variables on dividend payouts are stronger than the effects of CEMs. For family controlled non-holding BG companies, there is no empirical support for either the rent extraction or the reputation building hypotheses. The company-specific financial control variables are the main determinants of dividend payouts for family controlled non-holding BG companies., Aufsatz in Zeitschrift |
| title | Dividend payouts: majority control and rent extraction |
| title_auth | Dividend payouts: majority control and rent extraction |
| title_full | Dividend payouts: majority control and rent extraction Seniha Besim, Cahit Adaoglu |
| title_fullStr | Dividend payouts: majority control and rent extraction Seniha Besim, Cahit Adaoglu |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dividend payouts: majority control and rent extraction Seniha Besim, Cahit Adaoglu |
| title_in_hierarchy | Dividend payouts: majority control and rent extraction / Seniha Besim, Cahit Adaoglu, |
| title_short | Dividend payouts: majority control and rent extraction |
| title_sort | dividend payouts majority control and rent extraction |
| topic | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift |
| topic_facet | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift |
| url | https://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/JBEM/article/view/6808/5975, https://doi.org/10.3846/jbem.2018.6808 |