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|a This paper studies the interaction of government debt and financial markets. This interaction, termed a "diabolic loop", is driven by government choice to bail out banks and the resulting incentives for banks to hold government debt rather than self-insure through equity buffers. We highlight the role of bank equity issuance in determining whether the "diabolic loop" is a Nash Equilibrium of the interaction between banks and the government. When equity is issued, no diabolic loop exists. In equilibrium, banks' rational expectations of a bailout ensure that no equity is issued and the sovereign-bank loop is operative.
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1785966011994865664 |
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Electronic Resources |
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Cooper, Russell W., Nikolov, Kalin |
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Cooper, Russell W., Nikolov, Kalin |
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Cooper, Russell W. 1955- |
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r w c rw rwc, k n kn |
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lfer |
| contents |
This paper studies the interaction of government debt and financial markets. This interaction, termed a "diabolic loop", is driven by government choice to bail out banks and the resulting incentives for banks to hold government debt rather than self-insure through equity buffers. We highlight the role of bank equity issuance in determining whether the "diabolic loop" is a Nash Equilibrium of the interaction between banks and the government. When equity is issued, no diabolic loop exists. In equilibrium, banks' rational expectations of a bailout ensure that no equity is issued and the sovereign-bank loop is operative. |
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(DE-627)1040739148, (DE-599)GBV1040739148 |
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text-online-monograph-independent |
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Europäische Zentralbank: Working paper series |
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Europäische Zentralbank: Working paper series |
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Not Illustrated |
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Frankfurt am Main, Germany, European Central Bank, [2018] |
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Frankfurt am Main, Germany: European Central Bank, [2018] |
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DE-D117, DE-105, LFER, DE-Ch1, DE-15, DE-14, DE-L242, DE-Zwi2 |
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Government debt and banking fragility: the spreading of strategic uncertainty |
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Verbunddaten SWB, Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen |
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(108090442)no 2195 (November 2018) |
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1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten); Illustrationen |
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Europäische Zentralbank, Working paper series, no 2195 (November 2018) |
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Cooper, Russell W. 1955- VerfasserIn (DE-588)124082564 (DE-627)085625981 (DE-576)163798702 aut, Government debt and banking fragility the spreading of strategic uncertainty Russell Cooper, Kalin Nikolov, Frankfurt am Main, Germany European Central Bank [2018], 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten) Illustrationen, Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, Working paper series / European Central Bank no 2195 (November 2018), This paper studies the interaction of government debt and financial markets. This interaction, termed a "diabolic loop", is driven by government choice to bail out banks and the resulting incentives for banks to hold government debt rather than self-insure through equity buffers. We highlight the role of bank equity issuance in determining whether the "diabolic loop" is a Nash Equilibrium of the interaction between banks and the government. When equity is issued, no diabolic loop exists. In equilibrium, banks' rational expectations of a bailout ensure that no equity is issued and the sovereign-bank loop is operative., Nikolov, Kalin VerfasserIn (DE-588)171825772 (DE-627)308376641 (DE-576)353598569 aut, Europäische Zentralbank Working paper series no 2195 (November 2018) 219500 (DE-627)372370322 (DE-576)108090442 (DE-600)2123559-4 1725-2806, http://dx.doi.org/10.2866/888615 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2195.en.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/208229 Resolving-System kostenfrei, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2195.en.pdf LFER, LFER 2019-05-29T00:00:00Z |
| spellingShingle |
Cooper, Russell W., Nikolov, Kalin, Government debt and banking fragility: the spreading of strategic uncertainty, Europäische Zentralbank, Working paper series, no 2195 (November 2018), This paper studies the interaction of government debt and financial markets. This interaction, termed a "diabolic loop", is driven by government choice to bail out banks and the resulting incentives for banks to hold government debt rather than self-insure through equity buffers. We highlight the role of bank equity issuance in determining whether the "diabolic loop" is a Nash Equilibrium of the interaction between banks and the government. When equity is issued, no diabolic loop exists. In equilibrium, banks' rational expectations of a bailout ensure that no equity is issued and the sovereign-bank loop is operative. |
| title |
Government debt and banking fragility: the spreading of strategic uncertainty |
| title_auth |
Government debt and banking fragility the spreading of strategic uncertainty |
| title_full |
Government debt and banking fragility the spreading of strategic uncertainty Russell Cooper, Kalin Nikolov |
| title_fullStr |
Government debt and banking fragility the spreading of strategic uncertainty Russell Cooper, Kalin Nikolov |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Government debt and banking fragility the spreading of strategic uncertainty Russell Cooper, Kalin Nikolov |
| title_in_hierarchy |
no 2195 (November 2018). Government debt and banking fragility: the spreading of strategic uncertainty ([2018]) |
| title_short |
Government debt and banking fragility |
| title_sort |
government debt and banking fragility the spreading of strategic uncertainty |
| title_sub |
the spreading of strategic uncertainty |
| title_unstemmed |
Government debt and banking fragility: the spreading of strategic uncertainty |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.2866/888615, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2195.en.pdf, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/208229 |
