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Supplier enchroachment and consumer welfare: upstream firm's opportunism and multichannel distribution

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Personen und Körperschaften: Pan, Cong (VerfasserIn)
Titel: Supplier enchroachment and consumer welfare: upstream firm's opportunism and multichannel distribution/ Cong Pan
Format: E-Book
Sprache: Englisch
veröffentlicht:
Osaka, Japan The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University February 2018
Gesamtaufnahme: Shakai-Keizai-Kenkyūsho: Discussion paper ; no. 1020
Quelle: Verbunddaten SWB
Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen
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contents I revisit supplier encroachment under the framework of a two-part tariff contract. When a monopoly manufacturer supplies competing retailers and each retailer's contracting process is unobservable to the rival, the retailer's lack of knowledge vis-à-vis its rival's contract may undermine the manufacturer's commitment power, which prevents the manufacturer from achieving optimal profit. I demonstrate that when the manufacturer directly supplies the resale market, it can use the direct channel as a commitment tool and thus restore its market power. Even though the manufacturer's encroachment creates more competitors in the resale market, the resultant higher wholesale prices aggravate double marginalization, which may reduce consumer welfare. This result holds even when the manufacturer is very efficient in direct selling.
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spelling Pan, Cong VerfasserIn aut, Supplier enchroachment and consumer welfare upstream firm's opportunism and multichannel distribution Cong Pan, Osaka, Japan The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University February 2018, 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten) Illustrationen, Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research no. 1020, I revisit supplier encroachment under the framework of a two-part tariff contract. When a monopoly manufacturer supplies competing retailers and each retailer's contracting process is unobservable to the rival, the retailer's lack of knowledge vis-à-vis its rival's contract may undermine the manufacturer's commitment power, which prevents the manufacturer from achieving optimal profit. I demonstrate that when the manufacturer directly supplies the resale market, it can use the direct channel as a commitment tool and thus restore its market power. Even though the manufacturer's encroachment creates more competitors in the resale market, the resultant higher wholesale prices aggravate double marginalization, which may reduce consumer welfare. This result holds even when the manufacturer is very efficient in direct selling., Shakai-Keizai-Kenkyūsho Osaka Discussion paper no. 1020 1020 (DE-627)362341931 (DE-576)281223688 (DE-600)2106942-6, http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2018/DP1020.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197693 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext, http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2018/DP1020.pdf LFER, LFER 2019-05-29T00:00:00Z
spellingShingle Pan, Cong, Supplier enchroachment and consumer welfare: upstream firm's opportunism and multichannel distribution, Shakai-Keizai-Kenkyūsho, Discussion paper, no. 1020, I revisit supplier encroachment under the framework of a two-part tariff contract. When a monopoly manufacturer supplies competing retailers and each retailer's contracting process is unobservable to the rival, the retailer's lack of knowledge vis-à-vis its rival's contract may undermine the manufacturer's commitment power, which prevents the manufacturer from achieving optimal profit. I demonstrate that when the manufacturer directly supplies the resale market, it can use the direct channel as a commitment tool and thus restore its market power. Even though the manufacturer's encroachment creates more competitors in the resale market, the resultant higher wholesale prices aggravate double marginalization, which may reduce consumer welfare. This result holds even when the manufacturer is very efficient in direct selling.
title Supplier enchroachment and consumer welfare: upstream firm's opportunism and multichannel distribution
title_auth Supplier enchroachment and consumer welfare upstream firm's opportunism and multichannel distribution
title_full Supplier enchroachment and consumer welfare upstream firm's opportunism and multichannel distribution Cong Pan
title_fullStr Supplier enchroachment and consumer welfare upstream firm's opportunism and multichannel distribution Cong Pan
title_full_unstemmed Supplier enchroachment and consumer welfare upstream firm's opportunism and multichannel distribution Cong Pan
title_in_hierarchy no. 1020. Supplier enchroachment and consumer welfare: upstream firm's opportunism and multichannel distribution (February 2018)
title_short Supplier enchroachment and consumer welfare
title_sort supplier enchroachment and consumer welfare upstream firm s opportunism and multichannel distribution
title_sub upstream firm's opportunism and multichannel distribution
title_unstemmed Supplier enchroachment and consumer welfare: upstream firm's opportunism and multichannel distribution
url http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2018/DP1020.pdf, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197693