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Coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities: a differential game approach

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Veröffentlicht in: Games 12(2021), 1/15 vom: März, Seite 1-16
Personen und Körperschaften: Fruchter, Gila E. (VerfasserIn), Naseraldin, Hussein (VerfasserIn)
Titel: Coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities: a differential game approach/ Gila E. Fruchter and Hussein Naseraldin
Format: E-Book-Kapitel
Sprache: Englisch
veröffentlicht:
2021
Gesamtaufnahme: : Games, 12(2021), 1/15 vom: März, Seite 1-16
, volume:12
Schlagwörter:
Quelle: Verbunddaten SWB
Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen
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contents Production emissions in the industrial sector are a major source of environmental pollution. In this paper, we explore how emission considerations are integrated with production decisions. We develop a dynamic model consisting of two firms located in the same industrial park, which satisfies exogenously given demands in separate markets. The two firms can build up or rundown stocks (full backlogging), both of which are costly. The emission cost depends on the total output of the two firms. We develop Nash equilibrium feedback strategies, where each firm decides on its output based on its inventory or the inventories of both. We also develop a social planning solution where decisions are centralized. We present the analytic results for the total profits in these settings. The results show the benefits of a decentralized approach over a centralized one, provided there is a mechanism for coordination. Finally, emission costs are compared for the various solution concepts.
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spelling Fruchter, Gila E. VerfasserIn (DE-588)171606450 (DE-627)061826979 (DE-576)132388235 aut, Coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities a differential game approach Gila E. Fruchter and Hussein Naseraldin, 2021, Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2, Production emissions in the industrial sector are a major source of environmental pollution. In this paper, we explore how emission considerations are integrated with production decisions. We develop a dynamic model consisting of two firms located in the same industrial park, which satisfies exogenously given demands in separate markets. The two firms can build up or rundown stocks (full backlogging), both of which are costly. The emission cost depends on the total output of the two firms. We develop Nash equilibrium feedback strategies, where each firm decides on its output based on its inventory or the inventories of both. We also develop a social planning solution where decisions are centralized. We present the analytic results for the total profits in these settings. The results show the benefits of a decentralized approach over a centralized one, provided there is a mechanism for coordination. Finally, emission costs are compared for the various solution concepts., DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, centralized, decentralized, differential games, emission, industrial parks, Aufsatz in Zeitschrift DE-206, Naseraldin, Hussein VerfasserIn aut, Enthalten in Games Basel : MDPI, 2010 12(2021), 1/15 vom: März, Seite 1-16 Online-Ressource (DE-627)614096553 (DE-600)2527220-2 (DE-576)31395867X 2073-4336 nnns, volume:12 year:2021 number:1/15 month:03 pages:1-16, https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/1/15/pdf Verlag kostenfrei, https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010015 Resolving-System kostenfrei, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/257497 Resolving-System kostenfrei, https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010015 LFER, https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/1/15/pdf LFER, LFER 2021-03-09T15:26:51Z
spellingShingle Fruchter, Gila E., Naseraldin, Hussein, Coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities: a differential game approach, Production emissions in the industrial sector are a major source of environmental pollution. In this paper, we explore how emission considerations are integrated with production decisions. We develop a dynamic model consisting of two firms located in the same industrial park, which satisfies exogenously given demands in separate markets. The two firms can build up or rundown stocks (full backlogging), both of which are costly. The emission cost depends on the total output of the two firms. We develop Nash equilibrium feedback strategies, where each firm decides on its output based on its inventory or the inventories of both. We also develop a social planning solution where decisions are centralized. We present the analytic results for the total profits in these settings. The results show the benefits of a decentralized approach over a centralized one, provided there is a mechanism for coordination. Finally, emission costs are compared for the various solution concepts., centralized, decentralized, differential games, emission, industrial parks, Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
title Coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities: a differential game approach
title_auth Coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities a differential game approach
title_full Coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities a differential game approach Gila E. Fruchter and Hussein Naseraldin
title_fullStr Coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities a differential game approach Gila E. Fruchter and Hussein Naseraldin
title_full_unstemmed Coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities a differential game approach Gila E. Fruchter and Hussein Naseraldin
title_in_hierarchy Coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities: a differential game approach / Gila E. Fruchter and Hussein Naseraldin,
title_short Coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities
title_sort coordinating carbon emissions via production quantities a differential game approach
title_sub a differential game approach
topic centralized, decentralized, differential games, emission, industrial parks, Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
topic_facet centralized, decentralized, differential games, emission, industrial parks, Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
url https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/1/15/pdf, https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010015, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/257497