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Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach

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Veröffentlicht in: Games 12(2021), 1/14 vom: März, Seite 1-16
Personen und Körperschaften: Abe, Takaaki (VerfasserIn)
Titel: Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach/ Takaaki Abe
Format: E-Book-Kapitel
Sprache: Englisch
veröffentlicht:
2021
Gesamtaufnahme: : Games, 12(2021), 1/14 vom: März, Seite 1-16
, volume:12
Schlagwörter:
Quelle: Verbunddaten SWB
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contents In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is "moderate", then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a partition function form game. We also show that if the technology for the low-cost production can be copied, then the cost advantage may prevent a cartel from splitting.
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spelling Abe, Takaaki VerfasserIn (DE-588)1192341562 (DE-627)1670678067 aut, Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs a partition function approach Takaaki Abe, 2021, Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2, In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is "moderate", then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a partition function form game. We also show that if the technology for the low-cost production can be copied, then the cost advantage may prevent a cartel from splitting., DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, cartel formation, Cournot competition, partition function form game, stability, Aufsatz in Zeitschrift DE-206, Enthalten in Games Basel : MDPI, 2010 12(2021), 1/14 vom: März, Seite 1-16 Online-Ressource (DE-627)614096553 (DE-600)2527220-2 (DE-576)31395867X 2073-4336 nnns, volume:12 year:2021 number:1/14 month:03 pages:1-16, https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/1/14/pdf Verlag kostenfrei, https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010014 Resolving-System kostenfrei, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/257496 Resolving-System kostenfrei, https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010014 LFER, https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/1/14/pdf LFER, LFER 2021-03-09T15:26:50Z
spellingShingle Abe, Takaaki, Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach, In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is "moderate", then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a partition function form game. We also show that if the technology for the low-cost production can be copied, then the cost advantage may prevent a cartel from splitting., cartel formation, Cournot competition, partition function form game, stability, Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
title Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach
title_auth Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs a partition function approach
title_full Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs a partition function approach Takaaki Abe
title_fullStr Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs a partition function approach Takaaki Abe
title_full_unstemmed Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs a partition function approach Takaaki Abe
title_in_hierarchy Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach / Takaaki Abe,
title_short Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs
title_sort cartel formation in cournot competition with asymmetric costs a partition function approach
title_sub a partition function approach
topic cartel formation, Cournot competition, partition function form game, stability, Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
topic_facet cartel formation, Cournot competition, partition function form game, stability, Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
url https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/1/14/pdf, https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010014, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/257496